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I, Introduction
Ivan the Terrible (Tsar ■ /an IV) is one of the most 
frequently studied figures in kjssian history. He receives 
so much attention because he occupied a pivotal position in 
the historical growth of his country. His reign saw Russian 
expansion to the South and hast with the conquests of Kazan, 
Astrakhan, and Siberia. The seeds of contact with the West 
which were cultivated by Peter the Great were planted by 
Ivan. Also of great interest is his policy of dividing the 
country into two halves, the oprichnina, Its attendant viol- 
ence and social and economic devastation have been topics 
of a fiery debate among historians through the a es. many 
believe that Ivan suffered from a mental illness which caused 
him to act irrationaily and others believe that ne was a 
wise ruier who had his sights set on the future.
The debate on the nature and consequences of Ivan's 
reign is due to the paucity of sources on the period. In 
1626, the Kremlin's archives burned and with it many of the 
records of sixteenth-century Muscovite society. The sources 
that exist are mainly the accounts of foreign travellers to 
Russia, such as Giles Fletcher ant' Heinrich Staden. The acc­
uracy of these writings is questionable, however. Many of 
them were written several years after Ivan's death and many 
were based on stories that the authors heard second- or 
third-hand at best. Others were obvious exaggerations of
1
2conditions that were meant to persuade the authors* sover­
eigns to approve their proposals for action against Russia. 
Heinrich Staden*s work is an example of this last type of 
work.
The other major literary source on Ivan’s reign is the 
correspondence between the Tsar and Prince Andrei M. Kurbskii 
who fled from Russia to Lithuania to escape Ivan’s wrath.
Much of the personality and thought process of the Tsar is 
interpolated from these letters. The events of Ivan’s child­
hood are set in the correspondence. There are large gaps in 
the knowledge of historians, but they use the available sour­
ces, especially Kurbskii to offer conjecture in order to com­
plete the picture of Ivan’s reign.
Ivan IV is also important because he demonstrates the 
differences between Russian and Western historians. Many of 
the Russians do not absolutely condemn the autocrat for his 
brutality. They accept it for the simple reason that viol­
ence has been such a constant force in Russian society, from 
the Mongol conquest of Russia to Stalin’s massive purges.
The historians of the West, on the other hand, treat him as 
an aberration. His oprichnina was a legalized reign of ter­
ror that is completely unjustifiable in their opinion. An­
other difference is that Russian nistorians of the Soviet per 
iod concentrate on class interests and class conflicts where­
as Westerners deal with conflicts between individuals or 
small groups.
II. Russian Historians
An analysis of the multitude of interpretations of the 
reign of Ivan IV must begin with Russian historians. The ex­
amination of the trends in Russian historiography sheds light 
on the interpretations of American and English historians. 
Russian historical work on the Tsar shows visible effects of 
manipulation by contemporary rulers. There have been broad 
changes in the prevailing views on the nature of Ivan's reign. 
Some of these changes are attributable to the discovery of 
previously unknown sources and some to the forced interpret­
ation of a more recent Russian dictator.
The Communist revolution of 1917 is a key event in the 
periodization of Russian historical work on Ivan IV. Before 
the Soviet era, and especially before the rule of Josef Sta­
lin, Russian historians were free to interpret Ivan's reign 
without restriction. There were two predominant views of 
Ivan at the time. The first is epitomized by Sergei F. Plat­
onov who was a member of the St. Petersburg school of hist­
ory which believed that Ivan faced unyielding opposition from 
the traditional aristocracy whose power was based on their 
ancestral votchina landholdings. The Tsar instituted the 
oprichnina to crush the power of the aristocracy by exiling 
or executing many of them and confiscating their land. He 
was reacting to the apparent attempts to steal his power 
through the chosen council (izbranaia rada). Platonov recog­
nized that Ivan's personality perverted the oprichnina and
3
4facilitated grave excesses by the oprichniki. On the confus­
ion that was inherent in the oprichnina’s terror, Platonov 
claimed that "the Tsar's implementation of this plan was ac­
companied by such a tangle of details that he bewildered his 
contemporaries, for they could not grasp the thrust of his 
endeavor."* On final analysis, the oprichnina was a neces­
sary action in the struggle against the aristocracy and it
ended successfully: "the system of princely landowning was 
2shattered."
V.O, Kliuchevskii typified the second major interpret­
ation, He was of the Moscow historical school which stressed 
the importance of understanding Ivan's personality and men- 
t al condi t i on i n appraising t he opr i chn i na. His wr i t ing i n- 
cludes a "Character Sketch of Ivan IV"* in which he explained 
that "either nature or his upbringing deprived hirn of all 
moral balance, and so inclined him always to take the evil 
course whenever he found himself confronted with even the 
smallest difficulty in life."^ Kliuchevskii suggested that 
Ivan would have been an interesting subject for any psycho­
logist. As Ivan tried to establish absolute power, he came 
into conflict with the aristocracy whose power, he claimed, 
was based on complex networks of social traditions and conn­
ections. Kliuchevskii pointed out that Ivan instituted the 
oprichnina only after more moderate methods had failed. He 
was completely unforgiving in asserting that the oprichnina 
did not represent society's true nature, hut demonstrated 
Ivan's mental imbalance. The aristocracy was allegedly the
5target of the oprichnina, but relatively few boyars were its 
victims. Kliuchevskii concluded that the nec effect for Rus­
sian society was disastiousiy unsuccessful. "He believed that 
the ruler, acting in the context of tensions between the aut­
ocracy and the aristocracy, had torn apart a social fabric
5which was being rewoven." He maintained that Russia would 
have experienced the same future progress without Ivan and 
he simply caused unnecessary hardship. Ivan's importance to 
history is therefore of a negative nature.
Platonov and Kliuchevskii are representative of the two 
major pre-revolutionary schools of thought on Ivan's reign, 
and as such, they illustrate a shortcoming of earlier works—  
they concentrated almost exclusively on the oprichnina as the 
central event of Ivan's reign. They downplayed the fact that 
regardless of the oprichnina's devastating immediate effects, 
it consumed only seven years of Ivan's fifty year reign. His 
value to the future can only be accurately calculated after 
analyzing ail fifty years. The oprichnina is tempting to the 
student of history because it is such an aberration in the 
course of normal human events. Attention is diverted away 
from the less "interesting" events of Ivan's rule, but another 
more recent Russian autocrat, Josef Stalin, came to Ivan's 
rescue. Stalin brought all aspects of Soviet society under 
his control. He dictated an official interpretation of his­
tory, including an obligatory view of Ivan IV. Stalin deman­
ded that historians follow his view that Ivan was a "great and 
wise ruler" who courageously faced hostility from within and
6abroad. In Statin’s view, Ivan was fighting the feudal aris­
tocracy with the oprichnina, but he failed because he was not 
ruthless enough in his tactics.
Most of the works of the Stalin era are available only 
in Russian, so analyses of the works themselves must be exam­
ined to fully understand their interpretations. A common 
vein running through historiographical works on this era is 
the emphasis on the significance of the conference at the 
Moscow branch of the Institute of History of the Academy of 
Sciences in May 1956. The date of this meeting is important 
because it closely followed the Twentieth Party Congress 
where Krushchev initiated the policy of Mde-StalinizationM.
The conference was intended to effect a reevaluation of Ivan 
and his reign. The remarks of S.M. Dubrovskit at this meet­
ing are crucial in this analysis of the historical works of 
the Stalin period.
Dubrovskii, a specialist in the Stoiypin reforms, lashed 
out against the historical, publications of the Stalin period. 
His major target was the work of R.Iu. Wipper who bowed meek­
ly to the view of Stalin. Wipper was open to attack by Dub­
rovskii because his background did not coincide with his 
analysis of Ivan; he specialized in ancient Greece and Rome, 
not Russia. He had been opposed to the Bolsheviks in the 
Revolution of 1917, but in 1922 when he returned to Moscow 
from Latvia, he revised his biography of Ivan by blasting 
the newly discovered German sources on the oprichnina. He 
a l s o  added various bits of Marxist grandiloquence and comments
7about the enduring aggressive nature of Germany against Rus­
sia. The third edition of his work which was published in 
1947 at the height of the period of idolizing Ivan, was the 
most extreme example of his excessive flattery towards the 
Tsar and his reign. He tied German aggression to the German 
scholars’ attempts to reevaluate the works of sixteenth-cen­
tury German oprichniki, such as Heinrich Staden, in a manner 
that would belittle the grandeur of the Russian people:
"In the campaign the German scholars were to play 
the part of pioneers— to collect proof of the 
physical unfitness and cultural incompetence of 
the Slavonic race in general, and of the Russian 
people in particular.”6
Wipper's work centered on the idea that conflict was 
at the core of Ivan's reign. The Tsar allied himself with 
the rising gentry in a battle to crush the power of the trad­
itional aristocracy. Wipper asserted that Ivan was strugg­
ling to establish a strong centralized monarchy that could 
effect fairness and Justice in society. He claimed that as 
Ivan's reign continued, especially after the start of the 
Livonian War, the aristocracy increasingly undertook treas­
onous activities in order to strengthen their position.
Ivan instituted the oprichnina to eliminate the disloyalty. 
Wipper maintained that any cruelty associated with the op­
richnina was a response to the stimulus of aristocratic sed­
ition. He criticized those historians who concentrated on 
Ivan's brutality:
"The intense emphasis on Ivan's cruelties, the 
stern, withering condemnation of his personality,
8the tendency to regard him as mentally unbalanced—  
this belongs to the age of sentimental enlighten- 
ment and fashionable liberalism."?
He further claimed that Ivan ’’cannot be accused of being over- 
suspicious. On the contrary, his failing was that he imposed 
too much confidence in the Guard and the administration he 
had formed." This is an extraordinary assertion for if it 
is true, then literalLy thousands of traitors surrounded the 
Tsar. He even implied that Metropolitan Filipp was a con­
scious accomplice to the treason.
Wippcr's adherence to the Stalinist view is best seen 
in his claim that Ivan’s contemporaries misunderstood and 
distorted his policies, both deliberately and unintention­
ally, and consequently later historians have portrayed Ivan, 
not as a brilliant leader, but a brutal tyrant. He, however, 
asserted that Ivan was "a first-class talent in diplomacy
and was entirely in his element when It came to international
9affairs." He based his entire analysis of the oprichnina 
on criticizing the accounts of Staden and Schiiehttng who, 
he claimed, wrote false accounts to achieve ulterior goals.
Wipper’s most glaring fault was that he overestimated 
Ivan’s talents and abilities. He accepted all of the posi­
tive statements about Ivan and ignored the negative comments. 
Herein lies a problem: assuming that the positive data are 
true, including Ivan’s accusations of treachery, then there 
was an appreciable portion of the population involved in 
the alleged treason. His treatment of Ivan as a brilliant
9diplomat forgot that the Livonian War, the Tsar’s largest 
project, was a devastating failure for Russia.
M.N. Pokrovsky’s History of Russia, which first appeared 
in 1910, was based on a Marxist view of history. Following, 
suit, his analysis of the reign of Ivan IV was founded on 
an examination of broad socio-political processes. He claimed 
that the Russian economy was in the middle of a slow but 
sweeping transformation. Feudalism was waning during Ivan’s 
time and its decline gave rise to a market economy. His main 
thesis is that rather than effecting a qualitative change 
in Russian society and economy, Ivan’s policies caused a 
quantitative change. The move toward a money-based economy 
merely accelerated in this time. Pokrovsky later contra­
dicted himself by stating that Ivan hampered the development 
of a money economy. He also contradicted his statement that 
no qualitative changes took place by saying that Ivan brought 
about changes in the structure of society to facilitate the 
transformation of the economy.
Pokrovsky focused on the society of sixteenth-century 
Russia rather than on the Tsar. He denied the idea that 
Ivan's policies, especially the oprichnina, were intended to 
root out treachery. He began his study of the period by harsh 
ly criticizing the writings of Prince A.M. Kurbskii who was 
one of the major proponents of the idea that Ivan acted ir­
rationally with the establishment of the oprichnina. His 
emphasis on the significance of society in shaping history
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leads to many of the same motivations lor the oprichnina as 
other historians propound. He claimed that the large aris­
tocratic landholdings were liquidated because the poorer pom- 
estchiks, the gentry, desperately needed money or land. The 
widespread confiscation of aristocratic lands helped to al- 
1e v i ate this problem.
Pokrovski’s social class argument starts with an nili — 
a nee be t ween t he aristocracy, ge n t ry, and the me rc han t s.
These groups shared common interests. for example, the three 
groups all benefitted from the conquest of Kaxan and Astra­
khan; the aristocracy and the gentry got new lands and the 
merchants gained access to the Volga trade route. the Livo­
nian War was a pivotal point in the breakup of this alliance. 
The aristocracy opposed the war and advised Ivan to cease 
fighting, while the gentry who were the warriors benefitted 
grea11y f rom i t and hoped for its eon t i nuat i on. The a11 lance 
was destined to fail because the two sides were diametrically 
opposed on ideology. The aristocracy yearned for a return to 
the structure of society in the past and the gentry worked for 
the establishment of a new social order.
According to Pokrovsky, Ivan personally intended for 
the oprichnina to strengthen his autocracy. This attempt was 
premature and would not succeed until Peter the Great's reign. 
Pokrovsky asserted that it was a rational policy that was 
prone to violence because sixteenth-century Russian society 
was prone to violence. He also stated that the activities
of the oprichniki were present at other times though in les­
ser numbers. The oprichnina, therefore, was simply the aug­
mentation of common occurrences. He said that the departure 
to Alexandrova Sloboda was not unusual, in fact, it was an 
annual trip. He p< i .iLod out that it could not have been 
spontaneous because it would have required more than one day 
to plan— those accompanying Ivan had sufficient time to make 
arrangements for their wives and children to join them. He 
added that Ivan appeared to age twenty years, not because of 
a mental breakdown, but because he was raised in the ways of 
the past and he now had to break completely with the past.
He experienced extreme anguish at the thought of turning his 
world upside down.
Pokrovsky concluded with two important concepts. One 
is that much of the depopulation and economic hardship foll­
owing the oprichnina was due to the peasants’ reactions rath­
er than Ivan’s policies:
’’Like ants from a disturbed anthill the population 
ran off from these old cultivated places, seized 
by the oprichnina--ran off with no thought but how 
to save themselves from the new order of things 
so abruptly ushered in. it is no accident that the 
maximum depopulation of the county of Moscow coin­
cides with the peak of the oprichnina."9.5
The second concept is that Ivan’s reign stepped up the pro­
cess of transforming society and only in later times did the 
aristocracy rebound and strengthen its position. Ivan’s 
policies, he asserted, facilitated great economic progress. 
One fact that he ignored here is that Ivan’s murdering of 
his son Left Russia without a itrong successor which led to
12
tne Time of Trouble which may have been one of the causes 
o f renewed ar i s tocratic powe r.
Dubrovskii’s attack on the Stalinist view continued with 
attacks on others biographies by S.V. Bakhrushin, P.A. Sadikov, 
and 1.1. Smirnov. These three, like Wipper, overestimated 
Ivan as a Tsar who acted in the interest of the people. They 
followed the prevailing interpretation of Ivan which was dec­
ided upon by Stalin whose view was delineated in a convers­
ation with Kisenstein, the director of Ivan Groznyi, the film 
about tvan’s life. Stalin stated that Ivan was a ’’great and 
wise ruler,”^  and he used Ivan’s reign to justify his own 
reign of terror. Stalin, however, was not a historian and 
Dubrovskii castigated Bakhrushin, Sadikov, and Smirnov for 
blindly following his interpretation.
S.V. liakhrush i n ’ s work wa s ba sed on t he premi se that 
the pervasive social tensions were the result of a conflict 
of interests surrounding, the Tsar’s desire to consolidate 
his power. The rising gentry and the portion of the aristo­
cracy who relied on court positions for their power saw that 
a strong centralized administration would benefit them. The 
landed aristocracy, on the other hand, realized that these 
changes would undermine their ability to own large estates 
and therefore maintain their own authority. According to 
Bakhrushin, Ivan instituted the oprichnina to achieve his 
goal and was completely successful in establishing a unified, 
centralized country. He asserted that the oprichnina was
n”a reform which was cruel in form hut essentially answered 
the p u r p o s e . H e  credited Ivan with the initiative to im­
prove Russia, hut he was more restrained in his praise than 
Wipper.
1.1. Smirnov founded his work on the same class struggle 
premise that Bakhrushin used. Ivan introduced hroad reforms 
meant to undercut the power of the aristocracy. Smirnov 
pointed out, also, that the gentry was a vital part in the 
establishment of the centralization of political administra­
tion. The aristocracy responded to Ivan’s reforms by step­
ping up its seditious activities. The Tsar answered with 
the oprichnina which Smirnov, like Bakhrushin, considered to 
he a rational policy designed to alleviate a serious short­
coming of society. In Smirnov’s opinion, the oprichnina was 
a sweeping success in removing aristocratic power and escort­
ing Russia into the future.
P.A. Sadikov was another major historian of Ivan IV, who 
wrote in the 1920’s and 1930’s hut whose work was published 
alongside Smirnov’s and Bakhrushin’s in the latter portion 
of Stalin’s reign. His work was strongly adherent to the 
Stalinist view of Ivan’s reign. His work is valuable to all. 
historians, regardless of their interpretations, because he 
was not afraid to admit that the oprichnina had severe, nega­
tive effects on Russian society. He of course emphasized 
facts that coincided with his conclusions, hut he also pre­
sented information that less scrupulous historians might 
conceal.
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George F edo t o v , in his study o i Me t ro p<> 1 i t n n Filipp's 
encounters with Ivan IV, said that Ivan instituted the op­
richnina to create a new administration and a new servitor 
class, the gentry. The Tsar resorted to this policy because 
he was unable to effect the change through peace!ul measures 
and reforms. Fedotov explained that the oprichnina, however, 
was not actually an escape from feudalism: "The paradox of 
this revolution is that, although directed against the re­
mains of the appanage tradition, it was itself vested in 
appanage forms." ^ "
Fedotov touched on the "personality" argument, saving 
that Ivan's maniacal condition shaped the brutality of the 
oprichnina. This was true, he claimed, only for its outward 
appearance. Inwardly, the oprichnina accomplished its goal, 
he asserted. He said that "the social make-up of the oprich­
nina also corresponded to its political goal."** He main­
tained that the random relocation of the gentry onto former 
aristocratic lands fatally interrupted the network of conn­
ections between the remaining appanage princes. He neglected 
to recognize, however, that the oprichnina victimized members 
of the service gentry and oprichniki as well as the aristo­
cracy.
The 1956 meeting ushered in the third stage of Russian 
work on Ivan IV. Dubrovskii noted that Stalin painted a 
pretty picture of Ivan, but his view was not of a Marxist 
nature. the meeting concluded with an agreement amongst the
historians that an unbiased examination of Ivan and an anal­
ysis of all aspects of sixteenth-century Russian society, 
which would deal with the lives of common men, were needed. 
The two most famous works on Ivan IV, those by Platonov and 
K1iuchevskii, illustrated that the focus of works completed 
before Mthe meeting" was too narrow and disregarded the soc­
iety which Ivan so greatly affected. They had concentrated 
on the oprichnina and the reasons behind it, but only scan­
tily looked at the economic, political., and social issues 
of Ivan's Russia.
The decade following the meet in*; saw Soviet historians 
abide by the formula of Dubrovskii and his colleagues. Ivan 
was portrayed as an irrational, powerful ruler and his mis­
takes were amply documented. they did not shv away from 
Ivan's cruelty and even highlighted its senseless, excessive 
nature. These historians, however, focused not entirely on 
Ivan himself, but rather on the society. The Tsar was exam­
ined for his part in any developments in society. Soviet 
historians of the 195()'s and I9b0's attempted to determine in 
whose interest Ivan's policies were carried out. This app­
roach is much more methodical arid actually is a less subjec­
tive way to look at Ivan. Many earlier historians, such as 
K1iuchevskii, fell into the trap of trying to psychoanalyze 
the Tsar which is absolutely impossible to do centuries after 
the subject lived. The existing contemporary works offer 
descriptions of the state of sixteenth-century Russian soci-
16
ety. By examining these, historians can provide a factual, 
albeit incomplete, view of Russian society and In doing so, 
can devote considerable attention to Ivin, because in any 
autocratic state, the ruler plays the key role in social, 
economic, or political developments or reforms. Judging Ivan 
by his role in society eliminates the psychoanalysis and 
renders an assessment of the Tsar according to factual data.
There were several points of agreement among the hist­
orians of the post-Stalin period. The rising gentry and the 
traditional aristocracy, according to the historians, pro­
vided continual conflict throughout Ivan’s reign in both soc­
ial and political arenas. Some of them have asserted that 
there was no perceptible link between Ivan and this struggle, 
but others have suggested that this struggle was caused by 
and sustained by Ivan’s policies against the old, established 
aristocracy. treatment of the oprichnina has taken the form 
of an overall examination of society and the conflicts 
therein.
Many of the historians of the late 19 5 C J ’ s and 19b()’s 
have produced monographic studies of very specific topics 
within Ivan’s reign. They used and recognized the value of 
earlier studies, but they rejected most of their conclusions, 
being extremely careful in drawing conclusions of their own. 
They set about publishing lists of people who made up diff­
erent groups in society which has helped to act as a cross- 
reference for future works. According to Robert Crummey, 
these historians owed a great deal to S.B. Veselovskii who
17
was well known for his expertise in history and related fields 
such as toponymy, genealogy, and historical geography.
Veselovskii was 41 in 1917 and had already established 
his own views which became an obstacle against his accept­
ance by Soviet historians. He emphasized explanations for 
landholding trends that failed to follow the traditional 
Marxist economic answer. He also neglected to discuss the 
Marxist stages of socioeconomic development which dominated 
the writings of the Stalin era. He spent his lite research­
ing the taxation, landholding, and agricultural economy of 
Muscovy, but late in his life, he began to write essays on 
the reign of Ivan IV. He followed his own beliefs, but he 
was wise enough to know that publication of his work while 
Stalin was in power would not be expedient. In 1963, the 
Academy of Sciences compiled and published his work on Ivan IV. 
The problem with the work is that it is a compilation of 
essays, not a total, coherently connected examination of the 
Tsar's reign. As Cruinmey noted, many sections of the book 
are obviously rough drafts.
Veselovskii believed that the oprichnina was a result 
of real social and political conflicts. He did, however, 
attack Platonov's view that the oprichnina was designed to 
counter the power of the aristocratic estates. He used the 
writings of Ivan’s contemporaries who found the Tsar’s poli­
cies incomprehensible. He asserted that Ivan had to fight 
against his court elites who used their power, which was
18
based on their positions in the military and the Boyar Duma 
and not on their princely estates as Platonov claimed, to 
increase their overall authority. When the aristocracy began 
to accumulate too much power at court, Ivan resolved to 
launch an assault on them. He abandoned Moscow for Aleksan­
drova Sloboda and divided the country into zemschina and 
oprichnina. As Veselovskii explained, Ivan actuallv empowered 
the elites with this national division by leaving the admini­
stration of the zemschina to them. It was only due to its 
extreme tyranny that the oprichnina was successful in destroy­
ing the power of the aristocracy.
The question of the oprichnina’s social purpose was add­
ressed by Veselovskii as well. He pointed out that Ivan 
attacked many of his allies while leaving many aristocratic 
estates untouched. Relatively few aristocrats were actually 
affected in comparison to the incredible economic and social 
upheaval that the oprichnina caused. The inconsistencies 
mount when one realizes that the power of the aristocracy 
rested not in their estates but in their court positions. 
Veselovskii also cited the fact that most of the aristocrats 
owned vast tracts of land away from their main estates. He 
asserted that the lands selected for the oprichnina were 
meant to supply revenue and land for the rising gentry which 
was Ivan’s ally. In fact, many of those hurt by the oprich­
nina were actually members of the gentry. Veselovskii's 
argument ended up resembling K1iuchevskii*s thesis that Ivan’s
19
personality shaped the Tsar’s policies in the struggle against 
the entrenched aristocracy* Ivan used his power to wreak 
havoc on the aristocracy which he saw as attempting to usurp 
his authority. The oprichnina not only destroyed the power 
of the aristocracy, it crushed any possibility of represcnt- 
a t i ve gove rrime n t.
Vesel ovski i 1 s study of Ivan IV made two significant 
contributions to the body ol work on the Tsar. While he 
of fered no star11i ng1y ori gina1 cone 1us i ons, hi s co11ecti on 
of particular facts has provided a basis for successive hist­
orians to build upon. He also successfully dissected Plat­
onov's view that a simple class struggle was the cause of the 
oprichnina. His work, however, showed the shortcoming that 
Dubrovskii warned against in 195b: it dealt almost exclusively 
with Ivan’s motives and greatly ignored the enduring social 
results of his reforms and policies.
The historians who succeeded those of Stalin's era re­
mained entrenched in the foundation that earlier historians 
had developed. They have produced a multitude of very speci­
fic monographic studies that provide factual analyses, but 
not original conclusions. Many new areas in the political, 
economic, and social worlds were brought to light in the 
works of these historians. They examined all of the existing 
interpretations and determined to what extent they fit into 
the factual framework that Veselovskii and his successors 
established. Collectively, these historians changed the
20
face of Soviet historical work on Ivan IV by Introducing new 
viewpoints and methodology.
Ruslan G. Skrynnikov was one of the most prominent hist­
orians to write about Ivan IV in the 1960's. His most impres­
sive characteristic is his meticulous examination of a wide 
range of sources in his works. He chronologically delineated 
the details of Ivan’s reign, concentrating on the oprichnina, 
but he failed to pin down a single interpretation that can 
encompass his true beliefs. His writings conformed to a wide 
variety of popular views on Ivan's reign. Without reaching 
a succinct resolution, he analyzed the society and groups 
therein during Ivan's time in an effort to more fully under­
stand the oprichnina. This was a valiant attempt at factual 
analysis, but Skrynnikov fell short because he failed to 
round his study out with a definite conclusion.
Skrynnikov initially appeared to follow the common view 
that Ivan had aligned himself with the rising gentry in a 
struggle against the established aristocracy. Soon thereafter, 
his writing increasingly described greater complexity in the 
network of political connections. He moved from the conflict 
between the crown/gentry alliance and the landowning aristo­
cracy to a situation where the gentry joined certain court 
elites in enacting reforms which effected the conflict that 
Led to the oprichnina. He then switched to an alternative 
explanation of the oprichnina which pitted Ivan against the 
last remaining appanage princes, especially the Suzdal' group,
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rather than the entire aristocratic class. He neglected, 
however, to explicate the nature and extent of the power of 
these princes. He never showed that th:y posed a threat to 
the Tsar, thereby making the oprichnina a rational defensive 
maneuver. He claimed that these princes provided a spring­
board from which Ivan jumped into conflict with a wider range 
of groups within the aristocracy.
Skrynnikov said that the oprichnina, which began as a 
rati ona1 poli cy, wa s t rans formed i nto an unres t ra i ned reign 
of terror This concept brought him close to Kiiuchevskii's 
interpretation of the oprichnina as a rational institution 
which later degenerated into an unbridled crime spree. Skryn 
nikov emphasized the role of Ivan's mental condition as well. 
He claimed that the Tsar's continual attention to the threats 
that he believed faced him shaped the policies and processes 
of the oprichnina. Ivan was sure that a large portion of 
the aristocracy was scheming to rob him of his power. He 
was particularly convinced that the boyars of the Novgorod 
area were the most heavily involved in the treason. The op­
richnina became increasingly sadistic and immoral as Ivan's 
chosen oprichniki used their new power to commit grave injust 
ices in order to line their own pockets. As Crummey pointed 
out, Skrynnikov missed the point on the issue of the Novgorod 
operation and other major targets of the oprichnina because 
he asserted that the number of people actually executed by 
the oprichniki was, in reality, much lower than Ivan's con­
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temporaries cLaimed. What these chroniclers alluded to that 
Skrynnikov ignored was the overall impact of these massive 
attacks. The devastation went deeper than the numerous exec­
utions performed by the oprichniki; it included destruction 
of homes and churches, tearing apart of families, and extreme 
economic deprivation. He claimed that the oprichnina weak­
ened the aristocracy, government administration, and the 
Church, but it failed to permanently break the authority of 
the aristocracy. Its positive effect was that it strengthened 
the gentry in the state bureaucracy. He was also unforgiving 
for the cruelty of the oprichniki: "The outrages perpetrated 
by members of the oprichnina were unprecedented and unjusti­
fiable.”^  According, to Skrynnikov, in view of the severity 
of the oprichnina's immorality, Ivan chose to cut short the 
reign of terror in 1572.
While Skrynnikov jumped between interpretations of Ivan's 
policies prior to the oprichnina, he stated that the oprich­
nina's brutality was a product of the Tsar's mental imbalance. 
He described the oprichnina's existence and its execution 
more fully than he provided the reasoning for the policy. 
Without ever explicitly stating a single purpose, he effec­
tively illustrated that the oprichnina was inherently irrat­
ional because the frequent shifts in policy and selection of 
victims followed no discernible pattern or form. Ivan never 
clearly demonstrated that his policies were intended to faci­
litate positive social change leading to a powerful central­
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ized autocracy: ’’the oprichnina was not consistent during the
seven years it existed; it did not pursue either subjectively
1 5or objectively, a single goal, principle, or plan.” Skryn-
nikov concluded his study of the oprichnina with the fore-
mentioned concepts, but he contradicted his own ideas about
the establishment of the terror. He said that:
"The failures in foreign policy led the Tsar’s 
counsellors to urge him vigorously to establish 
a dictatorship and use violence and terror to smash 
the opposition, but no major political decision 
could be taken without confirmation by the boyar 
council, and the known position of the council and 
church leaders did not augur well for the success 
of such an endeavor. This is the reason why the 
tsar was forced to perform a singular action. In 
an attempt to impose his will on the council of 
mighty feudatories he announced his abdication.
He calculated that such a move would enable him to 
compel the council to accept proclamation of a 
state of emergency.M
This certainly sounds as if Ivan had a plan and at least 
some of those around him understood and accepted it.
A.A. Zimin was another of the important historians of 
the 1960’s who studied Ivan IV. He used a pientitude of 
sources which convey various interpretations. lake Skrynni- 
kov, Zimin was hesitant to completely refute any thesis about 
Ivan’s reign. His work was centered on the idea that while 
Ivan's predecessors had subdued the other appanage princes, 
the actual power of the Tsar was incomplete. Ivan sought to 
consolidate his power and found allies in the gentry which 
depended upon the crown for its lands and positions. The 
landed aristocracy, which wished to retain the power that 
it enjoyed, acted as the opposition in the ensuing struggle.
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Up to this point, Zimin followed the most common approach to 
the conflict, but he forced ahead by showing that the aristo­
cracy was not a homogeneous group; but, was divided into 
princely families and boyars at the court. The princely fam­
ilies were Ivan's real enemies, whereas the boyars shared 
many of the same interests as the gentry. The boyars and 
gentry both relied on their power emanating from the court and 
not from their lands.
Zimin stated that by the middle of the sixteenth century, 
strengthening of the autocracy was inevitable and the ques­
tions were; How the changes would take place, and who was to 
benefit? He backed up this assertion by pointing, out that 
the struggle that surrounded the Tsar in his early years was 
waged in order to determine where power would reside in the 
absence of a strong autocrat. This period of sedition amongst 
the court elites ended when Ivan was crowned Tsar in 1547.
Ivan believed that the succession crisis of 1553 was the re­
sult of the treason that was pervasive in the court, but 
Zimin contended that this was not the case. He claimed that 
the event showed a definite factlonalization in the court 
which led to a stronger alliance between the Tsar and gentry 
in the area of policy making. At this time, Ivan began to 
shape his government into a coalition of crown, gentry, and 
progressive boyars. His goals were the strengthening of his 
centralized administration and decreasing the power and sig­
nificance of the entrenched aristocracy. through cautious
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implementation of its policies, Ivan’s government a 11 owed 
the aristocracy to retain many of its customary rights.
Th c op r i c hn ina o c c u pi ed a n import a n t place in Iva n ’s 
reign anti likewise in Zimin's work. He set it against a 
backdrop of enduring enmity between the gentry and aristo­
cracy which was only exacerbated by the reforms of the 155()’s. 
Ivan recognized that the gentry needed more land and greater 
control over their peasants, but the traditional aristocracy 
stood in his way because they still owned much of the land 
in the form of large estates. The reform movement saw the 
service gentry occupying most of the positions in the army 
and in the centralized government, but the aristocracy was 
able to retain the top positions in each. This continuing 
situation necessitated more stringent tactics on Ivan's part, 
which took the form of the oprichnina.
A key to understanding Zimin's interpretation of the 
oprichnina is comprehending the scope of the policies as he 
alleged. To be successful, the oprichnina had to root out 
the last appanage princes, solidify the Tsar's power, and 
completely unify the Russian lands. Ivan's main targets were 
the Church, Novgorod, and the Staritsa appanage. Ivan chose 
the Staritsa appanage as a target because his cousin, Vladimir 
Star it sky lived there. During the succession crisis of 15 5'3, 
Vladimir was the choice for successor to Ivan of the boyars 
who refused to swear allegiance to the Tsarevich. While many 
see irrationality and disorganization in all of these pur­
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poses and victims, Zimin demonstrated that these measures 
were all necessary it Ivan’s goals were to be met. He ass­
erted that the oprichnina was a rational set of policies, but 
he transcended the statement that it evolved out of a con­
i' 1i c t bet ween Isar and a r i s t oc rac y. His ana1y s i s det a i1ed the 
reasons that the oprichnina’s conceptual diversity was indic­
ative of its rationa1 nature.
lievond establishing the oprichnina’s cause and initial 
framework, Zimin clearly illustrated that the oprichnina 
plunged inti) contusion as Ivan’s persecution mania pushed the 
oprichniki into selecting victims throughout society. Kven 
members of the gentry were not immune to losing their lands, 
positions, or lives. Moving away from its rational beginnings, 
the oprichnina became an unreasonable reign of terror. An 
analysis of its victims, as a group, reveals a microcosm of 
the entire society. Kverv group ended up suffering.
Was the oprichnina therefore unsuccessful? Zimin said 
that it was not entirely a failure. the aristocracy, espec­
ially the members at Novgorod and Staritsa, had posed a poten­
tial threat to Lvan's authority, so the Tsar destroyed them.
In this respect, the oprichnina succeeded. Robert Crummey 
explained that this concept has caused a great deal of contro­
versy. One obvious question is how much power these oppos­
ition forces wielded. After all, the military and church 
men of Novgorod came from Moscow originally. The Church and 
crown had enjoyed a reciprocally beneficial relationship and
Vi,
.
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it seems probable that Ivan’s anger with some Church officials, 
such as Metropolitan Filipp, spilled over into an attack on 
the Church as a whole. Regardless oi the validity of Zimin's 
argument, his writing has caused serious debate which is a 
va1ua b1e con t r i but i on in it se1f.
Zimin's treatment of Ivan IV is a complex body of work.
He dealt with many interpretations oi the Tsar's life and 
reign. He did not adhere to the rigid class analysis of many 
other historians, such as Pokrovsky, for he showed that no 
class was secure from Ivan's wrath. His treatment oi the 
oprichnina was the most impressive portion of his work. He 
outlined the causes of the oprichnina, described its trans­
formation as a result of the Tsar's imbalanced mind, and 
demonstrated that it produced many new problems while exacer­
bating many existing ones and failing to alleviate the major 
flaws in society.
N.H. Nosov's study involved elective estate institutions 
and the early formation of local administrative organs during 
Ivan's reign. He, like Zimin, asserted that many aristocrats 
at court were actually allies of the Tsar in his reform eff­
orts. His work emphasized the role of economics in the hist­
ory of this period. He claimed that Russia was at a critical 
juncture in its economic development. It could have evolved 
into a market economy or fallen back into feudalism. His 
treatment of social classes mirrored his economic viewpoint. 
Neither the gentry nor the aristocracy stood firm consistently
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in their attitudes toward reforms or each other. Sometimes 
they fought each other and at other times, they joined forces 
to face a common enemy, as was the case in their struggle 
against the new merchant elite in the far North. Nosov’s 
writing clarified that in the Russia of Ivan’s time, a class 
analysis is useless with the continuallv changing alliance 
systems. Instead, he concentrated on the needs of the diff­
erent groups and how they coincided or differed.
Nosov's main subject was the structure of Ivan’s admini­
stration. He concentrated on changes that occurred in prov­
incial administration. The major change was the introduction 
of elected officials in local government. According to Nosov, 
these reforms were beneficial to everyone except the peasants 
on the estates. The boyars at the court were affected most 
favorably and thus became aligned with the Tsar in his efforts 
of reform. He explained the political and economic causes 
of the alliance between the gentry and the boyars at court, 
while Zimin, who stated that this alliance existed, went no 
further than saying that both groups relied on the Tsar for 
their power.
S.O. Schmidt, yet another post-Stalin era historian of 
Ivan IV approached the Tsar’s reign from a different direction. 
He specialized in the area of comparative history. He com­
pared events and trends that occurred in sixteenth-century 
Russian society with those of other contemporary Luropean
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countries or other periods of Russian history. His work 
centered on the early portion of Ivan’s reign. in his treat­
ment of this period, he employed the traditional interpret­
ation that a struggle between the gentry and the landowning 
aristocracy shaped contemporary history. His discussion of 
this topic was extremely complex as he attempted to describe 
the ever-shifting alliances between groups within the gentry 
and aristocracy. He warned against simplification of these 
alignments. Apart from his intuitive work in comparative 
history, Schmidt offered detailed analysis of small events 
that helped shape society.
The Russian historians who have written about the reign 
of Ivan IV are a heterogeneous group of scholars. It is 
simple to generalize and describe the periodization of Russian 
historical work on Ivan. Prior to the Revolution of 1917, 
historians debated mainly on the significance of Ivan’s men­
tal state in his policies. There were two predominant schools 
of thought on the Tsar in this period. The first was the St. 
Petersburg school, which was characterized by S.F. Platonov 
who believed that Ivan acted rationally in the establishment 
of the oprichnina. The second was the Moscow school to which 
V.O. Kliuchevskii belonged. These historians emphasized the 
mental condition of the Tsar in understanding his policies. 
Kliuchevskii and Platonov both claimed that there was a con­
flict between the traditional aristocracy and the rising ser-
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vice gentry, but they also both agreed that the conflict was 
waged over immediate power and they did not stress the Marx­
ist idea of socioeconomic causes of the oprichnina.
During Stalin's rule, historians followed the dictator's 
official view of Ivan as a great hero of Russian history.
They idolized the Tsar and claimed that he was justified in 
his attempts to crush the aristocracy which stood in the way 
of his attempts at Improving muscovite society. Following 
the 1956 meeting of historians at the Moscow branch of the 
Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, historians 
began to produce tactual examinations of very specific events 
within Ivan's reign. They ushered in an era of originality 
with their mono;* ra ph i c s t ud i e s, bu t t hey f a iIed t o ach i e ve 
their potential dynamism by neglecting to fully challenge the 
conclusions of their predecessors.
The historians of the late 19 30's and 1960's worked with­
in the basic foundation of the earlier historians, but they 
did it differently. The works of the period before 1936 are 
rife with ideological, debates which have ended with large 
factions of historians who held similar views, but the works 
of the 1950's and 1960's offered many more personal inter­
pretations by attempting more objective analyses of Muscovite 
society. Crummey has warned that the Soviets may become 
static as they appear to be decreasing their debating. The 
present generation of Soviet historians has shown another
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limitation as well. Their numbers are much lower than in 
earlier periods and the most prominent publication of the 
time is Vese1ovskii*s , but he had died in 1952.
Russian historians are relatively forgiving of the Tsar 
for his numerous atrocities. They present reasons why his 
persecution mania was understandable' and the fact that he 
was typical of contemporary Kuropean rulers. A point that 
several Knglish and American historians note is that the 
Russians historically forgive their tyrants.
A trait in several Soviet historical works that is absent 
in Western works is a reliance on a Marxist interpretation 
of history. They discuss the socioeconomic forces that shape 
society. In Ivan's rei;*n , the c1 ass ana 1vs i s eoneentrates 
on the rising servitor gentry, which lit into the emerging 
market economy, and their opposition, the traditional land­
owning aristocracy which desired a resurgence of feudalism. 
Pokrovsky was one of the major proponents of this argument. 
Regardless of their acceptance of this view, all Russian hist­
orians realize that a brutal conflict occurred amongst the 
Muscovite people, but they have historically been willing 
to divert individual responsibility for it away from their 
leaders, past or present.
II. A m e r i c a n  and E n g l i s h  H i s t o r i a n s
Ivan IV has become a frequent' topic of study for Amcr- 
i c a n a ml Ki ig 1 i sh historians a nd b i og r a phe r s in t he t wen t i e t h 
century. Many of the Russian works on Ivan are based on a 
class analysis that is absent in the American and English 
studies. The Western writers arc* less forgiving of Ivan's 
brutality than are the Russians. In the body of Western 
works, there is a wide range of interpretations of the* value 
and purpose of I van's po1i c i es.
American and English accounts of Ivan’s reign have often
resembled biographies rather than historical, analyses. The
problem with biography is that it deals with the individual
and neglects the society around him. biographers also omit
facts that weaken their story. As A.J.E. lav lor says: ’’The
historian has to recognize that biography is a literary art,
much nearer to fiction or poetry than it is to serious his- 
1 7tory." When historians resort to biography rather than 
history, they tend to treat their subject as either good or 
evil, but nothing in between. American and English histor­
ians commonly fall into this trap. The Americans and Eng­
lish have produced everything from narrow analyses based on 
the Great Man theory of history which condemn Ivan to broad 
studies of sixteenth-century Russian society which discuss 
the Tsar's importance within the greater social framework.
Stephen Graham states that his Ivan the Terrible is a
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biography rather than an historical analysis of the Tsar's 
reign. He dealt exclusively with events involving Ivan; all 
matters of Russian society were omitted. The focus of this 
work was precisely what Dubrovskii later warned against, but 
it cannot be ignored because it was the first Knglish work 
on Ivan IV. It is a biography, but it was based on inform­
ation within earlier historical analyses. (Iraham offered 
no c one Iu s i on s a bou t t he value or legacy of Ivan's re i gn, 
but his choice of facts was sufficient to understand his view 
of the Tsar.
The most prevalent theme in Graham's writing is Ivan's 
deep devotion to religion. Kverv act centered on the' grace 
of God. He showed his biographical style in this respect 
by, himself, attributing Ivan’s success to God’s satisfaction 
with the Tsar. Ivan’s extreme religiousness increased the 
madness that Graham recognized. The Tsar would commit crimes 
and then repent profusely, but as time went on, he was stric­
ken by guilt of his terrible transgressions which pushed him 
closer to insanity.
Graham was not excessively critical of Ivau, though he 
did not try to conceal the Tsar’s brutality. He placed great 
blame on the aristocracy, as well as Ivan, for their conflict. 
He described the aristocrats’ refusal to swear allegiance 
to Tsarevich Dmitrii during Ivan’s illness in 1553 as a 
’’plot". The choice of the word ’’plot” was extremely effect­
ive in diverting sole responsibility from Ivan for his imm-
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ense suspicion of the aristocracy upon his recovery. While 
the boyars, who were the portion of the aristocracy which 
remained at court, were busy scheming for the usurpation of 
the Tsar's authority, he worked to achieve his goal of cen- 
t ra I i zat i on of author i t v . He ’ 1 ed pi ous 1 y and dec i tied that
the ruic*s governing the Church and the state needed to be 
changed to facilitate the concentration of power in his hands. 
He was personally involved in the establishment of the new 
Law code, but Graham suggested that his main motivation was 
centralization of the administration rather than improvement
of Russian society in the interest of the peasantry.
Regard less of his intentions, he was wise and just in 
the years preceding 1360. He allowed the people to have a 
voice in their governance:
"He received petitions from all and sundry and 
for the first time in Russian history the poorest 
man in the country could have access of some kind 
to the sovereign. He was vigorous in the Council 
of the Boyars. There was freedom in that Council 
to have a point of view other than his own."^
The people, Graham asserted, enjoyed the possibility of being 
ruled by the Tsar instead of the boyars who had caused them 
such hardship. The aristocracy, as a whole, however, disap­
proved of his democratic methods. They felt threatened and 
thus, the conflict between the two powers, Tsar and aristo­
cracy increased.
Graham claimed that Ivan wanted to replace the aristo­
cracy with the service gentry, which was loyal to him, but
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he was held back by the Influence of Anastasia who said "Let
i 9us fight the enemies of Russia, but not one another."
While she lived, Ivan locked his rage within himself and out­
wardly forgave those who crossed his path. Graham claimed 
that Ivan's two advisors, Adashev and Sylvester who also re­
strained his ire, were driven away by Anastasia, not by Ivan. 
He said that she could not tolerate their manipulation of 
her husband.
Anastasia died in 1560 of an unknown ailment. Graham 
said that Ivan did not believe that she had been poisoned, 
but Graham, himself, posed the question of the possibility 
of such an occurrence. He said that it was odd that there 
were no records of her illness or of previous visits by doc­
tors and that Andrei Kurbskii, in later years, allowed the 
idea a degree of credence. The effect of Anastasia's death, 
alleged Graham, was not that Ivan took his revenge on the 
aristocracy for poisoning her. It was that it removed the 
last restraint on Ivan's violent nature. The rage which was 
suppressed within him was released when his heart was dealt 
the grave blow of the loss of his wife.
Ivan began a reign of terror to root out the treachery 
which he saw all around him. Graham asserted that Ivan was
actually safer than if he were a weak, forgiving ruler because
20"slaves and Slavs require a tyrant to rule over them."
Ivan's murderous ways took on a strange shape in the oprich­
nina which was meant to crush his opposition. Graham des­
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cribed the confusion inherent in the structure of the oprich­
nina by demonstrating th <' Ivan was deeply religious while 
being an adherent to murder, sexual perversion, and all other 
forms of vice. The abdication in 1564, for example, was not 
a stratagem calculated to garner popular support; it was his 
greatest repentance. The fawning obedience of the society 
wa s s i mp iy a favorah1 e resu11, ins tead of a mot i ve.
Graham’s work is a fairly accurate presentation of the 
events of Ivan’s reign. One detriment to its historical val­
idity, however, is Graham’s tendency to fill gaps of inform­
ation with conjecture in order to complete the story of the 
reign. An instance of this guesswork is his treatment of 
the correspondence between Ivan and Kurbskii. The validity 
of these letters is the subject of a debate among historians, 
bul Gr a ham d es c r i bed lva n * s t h ought s i nd f e clings wh i1e c am- 
posing his replies to Kurbskii. This is clarly fabrication, 
but it does not greatly detract from the work because he was 
noncommittal in his conjecture.
Waither Kirchner’s History of Russia was first published 
in 1948, at the height of the Soviet historians’ idolizing 
Ivan. His writing reflected heavy reliance on the works of 
the Stalin period Soviet historians. He said that the Tsar's 
many accomplishments ’’anticipated future Russian development,"
a iand "research confirms such an I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e  re­
search to which he alluded was that of Soviets of the Stalin­
ist view. He asserted that Ivan was successful in his bid
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to reduce the power of the aristocracy, gaining support and 
expression in the zemsky sobor. Ivan assured the support of 
the gentry w-iich owed its power to the pomeste* systen, by 
removing the old aristocracy. The aristocracy, However, was 
not idle and presented strong opposition to the rI ir*s plans. 
Kirchner asserted that Ivan responded to the resistance by 
undertaking a daring move to force tno peasantry to .align 
itself with him. The move was Ivan’s retreat to Aleksandrova 
and it proceeded smoothly, resulting in the removal ot all 
obstacles to persecution of the aristocracy.
Kirchner held that Ivan was responsible for a large body 
of reforms dealing with peasants, the Church, local admini­
stration, and a new code of law. Some of the reforms led to 
positive trends such as the expansion of local administration 
and the introduction of elected officials to it. The most 
important policy of Ivan’s reign, though, was the oprichnina, 
Kirchner asserted. The apparent inconsistency of choice of 
lands that the oprichniki seized is clarified by understanding 
that the lands were chosen for their economic and military 
importance. While not completely rational, the oprichnina 
followed a basic framework that made it an effective tool for 
the Tsar to use to achieve his goaLs. The oprichnina suc­
cessfully removed the land, power and court positions of the 
traditional aristocracy, but at the same time, "its brutality 
and inhuman ways of tax collection Led to the flight of the
inhabitants and to depopulation." All things considered, 
even though it was abandoned after only seven years, the 
oprichnina achieved its purpose of transforming Russian soc­
iety and state structure.
K i rchne r foilowed h i s analy si s of i van's dones t i c po1i- 
cies with a discussion of the significance of the Tsar1s for­
eign endeavors. Kirchner's contribution to this topic was 
his acceptance of the fact that many of I v an’ s foreign poli­
cies came to naught. Their value lies in the fact that the 
direction of Russia's growth "was clearly conceived and defi­
nitely indicated as a future aim of Russian rulers,"^ under 
Ivan IV.
Kirchner is important among nor-Russian historians who 
have written on Ivan IV because he wrote during che time when 
Stalin ruled the Soviet Union and he was greatly influenced 
by the Soviet writers of the time. He openly stated that 
Ivan's policies paved the way for future developments m  
Russian society, but he did not adhere to Stalin's view that 
Ivan was a great and wise ruler. He acknowledged that Ivan's 
reign was riddled with brutality and illegality, but he said 
that these conditions do not alter the basic fact that Rus­
sian society greatly advanced while Ivan ruled. Kirchner's 
analysis of Ivan IV is but a small part of his study of Rus­
sian history, but he transcended a simple listing of the pol­
icies of the Tsar by describing the effects that these poli­
cies had on various aspects of society.
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Harold Lamb dealt with the growth of Russia trom 1400- 
1648, in his work, with special emphasis on the reign of 
Ivan IV. His work was first published in 1 9 4 8 and his inter­
pretation moderately reflects the influence ot contemporary 
Soviet historians. He asserted that the result of Ivan’s 
reign was the structure of the Russian state. Lamb did not 
idolize the Tsar, as Dubrovskii accused Uipper ot doing, but 
he pointed out that Ivan shaped a people.
Lamb cited K1iuchevsky*s work frequently* hut he dis­
agreed with K1i uchcvsky1s concent rat ion on I van *s persona 1i ty. 
He felt quite the opposite: "Ivan had never been insane.
Few men of his century had shown more intelligence; .and few, 
if any, with so much to fear had evidenced such stark cour- 
age.” Sometimes, however, the Tsar became wrapped up in 
his own dream world based on legendary historical Iigures 
about whom he had read in his self tutelage. Ivan retreated 
into fantasies because he felt that those around him were 
enemies. Lamb did not contend that the Tsar was some detached 
figure who roamed the Kremlin, but rather asserted that Ivan 
implemented his policies envisioning a return to the pros- 
perity of the era of "Moses and Tsar David" — Ivan idolized 
the great men of the Bible.
The incontrovertible fact of Ivan’s anger with the ari­
stocracy was born of a combination of experiences and press­
ures. "Ivan had inherited a predisposition to fear anu he
2 6had no one to confide in," asserted Lamb. As a child, Ivan
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spent his time roaming the Kremlin discovering the aristo­
crats* crimes, such as stealing from the treasury. He was 
wise enough, howeve r, to rema1n qui e t a bout wha th e  1ea rned, 
but he would never forget. He began to see himself as a div­
inely appointed ruler and chose to assume the title of Tsar. 
Ivan also felt that he had to lead the Church from Moscow 
which was to be its third centco after Rome and Constantin­
ople.
Lamb suggested that Ivan began to change around the
time of his illness in I r> 5 '3. He lashed out at his opponents
for the first time, the aristocracy viewed this change as
Ivan’s growing desire to eliminate them as a class. Tensions
increased and Ivan found himself opposing his advisors for
the sake of disagreement. The oprichnina was the climax of
this conflict. It was a brilliant move because it "combined
the impoverishment of the boyar class with the improvement
of the army." Ivan’s preoccupation with the serving class,
the gentry, which made up the army, led Ivan to believe that
the army was the state. Outside of the army, Ivan established
no consistent rule. This was the nature of the division of
the realm. Ivan’s feeling of divine right grew to a point
where he imagined that he was the builder of a totally new
nation and the enemy of all things old. A recurrent theme in
Lamb’s writing is the idea that ”a great actor was playing
28an extraordinary part.” Ivan was a brilliant tactician
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and he did anything necessary to achieve his goals. He was 
adept at accomplishing his aims while ostensibly endeavoring 
under a separate pretense. A glaring example was his ability 
to make the oprichnina appear to be a popular, modernizing 
crusade while its real purpose was to eliminate his oppos­
ition.
Lamb stated that Ivan’s thirst for progress became a lust 
for knowledge of foreign ideas and inventions. He retrieved 
his ambassadors from abroad and had them relay their experi­
ences to him. He also imported many foreign artisans to 
Moscow. Several of these foreigners met with opposition on 
their attempts to enter Russia even though the Tsar had sent 
for them which was indicative of the fact that most Russians 
wished to avoid outside contact while Ivan cultivated it.
Lamb highlighted the long term effects of Ivan’s reign 
more noticeably than the immediate effects. The Livonian 
War was a failure, but Ivan gained a foothold for contact 
with the West. The oprichnina caused widespread death and 
destruction, but it laid the foundations for a new society. 
Ivan was loved and feared by his people and he assumed a pro­
minent place next to Dmitri! Donskoi and Alexander Nevsky in 
their legends. ihese assertions brought Lamb’s interpretation 
of Ivan’s reign to resemble contemporary Soviet historians* 
views, but he stopped short of calling Ivan a ’’great and wise” 
progressive leader.
Elizabeth Sceger’s 1950 study of Russian history assigned
Ivan IV a prominent role in the drive to reform Muscovite 
society in the mid-sixteenth century. She portrayed the Tsar 
as a highly intelligent ruler who saw deficiencies and quest­
ioned the reasons for their existence. He asked "why so many 
thousands of monks were living idle in the many monasteries 
and what was being done with the enormous wealth that the 
Church was accumulating." Ivan also advocated local self- 
government and a new law code based on the will of the people 
According to Seeger, the ideas and patterns of the reforms 
were due to Ivan’s personal initiative.
Seeger divided her analysis of Ivan IV into two parts: 
the good Ivan and Ivan the Terrible. The oprichnina was the 
embodiment of the "terrible" part of his reign and owed its 
existence to Ivan’s hatred of the aristocracy* She pointed 
to three events that built the Tsar's distrust of the aristo­
cracy. First, the poor treatment of Ivan and his brother at 
the hands of the boyars in their childhood planted the seeds 
of conflict. The second event was the boyars’ refusal to 
swear allegiance to Ivan's son when Ivan was ill in 1553.
They claimed that Ivan's son was acceptable, but "the Tsar- 
itsa's brothers who will rule us while your son is growing"^* 
were cause for serious concern. Finally, Ivan's anger was 
solidified by his belief that the boyars had poisoned Anas­
tasia in 1560. Seeger treated Ivan's retreat to Alexandrova 
as a manifestation of his severe paranoia about the treason 
that he believed surrounded him.
Her view of the oprichnina was that it was Ivan’s way 
of depriving the aristocracy; which he suspected of treason, 
of their power. It had no pattern of plan. The oprichniki 
were selected by Ivan’s whims. It was not a far-reaching 
policy that would transform society and send it on the road 
to modernization. It was the irrational child of an irrat­
ional mind. Seeger asserted, however, that there was one 
great product of the oprichnina: the conquest of Siberia by 
the Cossacks who fought for the Stroganov family which enj^vec. 
membership in the oprichnina. Seeger stated that the Stroga- 
novs owned estates in the East and saw the Tatars as a threat, 
so they hired the Co** ^ks to fight for them.
Georg,e Backer approached the study of Ivan IV In an orig­
inal manner in his The l)ead 1 y Para 11 e 1: Stalin and Ivan the 
Terrible. He was not content with offering a simple present­
ation of the events of Ivan’s reign. He provided an analysis 
of history and he used the changing interpretation of Ivan IV
as his example. His thesis was that ’’history is only the re-
31creation of the past in the image of the present.” He said
that instead of history being the cause of the present, ”his-
32tory is the meaning the present gives to the past.” The 
pientitude of views on Ivan are proof of the idea. History 
is not static; it is a dynamic tool to reinforce the right­
eousness of one’s actions. He believed that the interpret­
ation of Ivan IV would continue to change and each time that 
it did, it would be a reflection of the values and standards
of Che historian.
Many parallels between Ivan IV and Josef Stalin are rea­
dily apparent. Both undertook violent purges whose victims1 
guilt was largely a product of the ruler's paranoia. They 
also both succeeded in endeavors to expand the Russian state. 
Both leaders brought an end to oligarchic rule in Russia.
They also increased the multi-national character of the nation.
Backer presented the account of Ivan's reign to provide 
background for his thesis. His analysis is riddled with 
statements that run counter to popular interpretations of the 
Tsar's reign. He asserted that the clergy, who educated Ivan 
in his youth, declared him of age at seventeen and that the 
government, not Ivan, was responsible for his coronation as 
Tsar. He also believed that the reform efforts of 1549 and 
1550 were due to clergy within the government. Backer main­
tained that Ivan opposed improving the lives of the peasants 
because doing so would have meant granting them more freedom. 
Ivan, however, was most interested in strengthening the auto­
cracy and he therefore needed to establish a powerful gentry 
whose power was based on service. Ivan had to provide the 
gentry with a workforce since they were needed at court and 
in the military. The peasants were the Labor force that Ivan 
sought, so he reduced their freedom of movement. Backer's 
treatment of the Livonian War is a demonstration of the con­
tinuous nature of historical trends. He discussed the war 
from the European point of view, presenting the debate of
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The Europeanswho was more dangerous, Russia or the Turks, 
chose to side with the Turks against the danger of Russia 
and Backer claimed that enmity still exists between Russia 
and Europe, but now the United States has replaced the Turks 
in this enduring state of tension.
The oprichnina, Backer asserted, was Ivan * s method of 
destroying the last vestiges of feudalism in Russia. Ku-rb- 
skii's flight to Lithuania was, after all, Backer claimed, 
an exercise of the feudal right of departure. Ivan was forced 
to choose between conceding to the aristocracy’s ancient 
rights or destroying them for good. Ivan chose the latter 
and employed every resource in his power: "The State, to Ivan, 
now had meaning, only as the instrument of his ambition."^ 
Ivan’s actions were all rationally thought out in Instituting 
the oprichnina. His departure to Alexandrova Sloboda was 
intended to solicit a promise from the people that he could 
deal with the aristocracy in any way that he wanted. The 
oprichnina, on the whole, was meant to increase the Tsar’s 
power and to more efficiently utilize the resources of the 
country in the war effort. Ivan effectively legalized the 
terror that he employed and again Backer suggested that his­
tory is constant: its chief characteristic— that of State
within che State— was to survive as part of the Russian gov­
ernmental system under the Soviets as the Cheka, which was 
later renamed O.G.P.U., N.K.V.D., and .4.V.I). The final result 
of the oprichnina was the completed installation of the auto­
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cratic concept. To describe the effects of the oprichnina, 
he used the accounts of Giles Fletcher who painted a picture 
of a devastated land. Feasants had no initiative. They were 
afraid of owning anything, for tear of losing their lives.
Backer's questioning of the interpretations of other 
historians led him to an original idea. He pondered the poss­
ibility that nineteenth century historians, such as V.O. 
Kliuchevskii and N.M. Karamzin, who wrote that Ivan's happi­
est years were those spent with Anastasia oi the House of. 
Romanov, were influenced by the fact that they wrote under 
Tsars of the Romanov family. Backer admitted, however, that 
this was an unlikely and fairly ridiculous concept, but it 
showed that he thought seriously about the sources which he 
used for his work.
Backer's assertion that Ivan's reign set the stage for 
the future of Russia was best illustrated as, "the Russia that 
he forged was, by the violence of its birth, the true ancest­
or of the state which, in 1917, was torn from the agony of 
the First World War."3* Backer went on to demonstrate that 
many of Stalin's actions following World War II had the sane 
intentions as Ivan's policies four centuries earlier: expan­
sion to the West and South. Backer claimed that Ivan's reign 
gave birth to the idea that the state had an extrahuman per­
sonality and therefore a destiny of its own. Subsequent rul­
ers have employed this concept to justify their action. Bac­
ker claimed that this concept of the state has caused Western
historians to view Ivan as an evil perpetrator of crimes ag­
ainst humanity. Soviet historians, on the other hand, have 
values based on this concept and can therefore see Ivan as 
a great and wise ruler. As an example, he quoted Wipper who 
blamed the boyars for the brutality of the oprichnina because
they ’’were too stupid to accept the personal deprivations
35necessary for the growth of the greatness ol the state."
Backer did not stop at providing parallels between Ivan 
and Stalfn, he addressed refutations of his theory. The most 
obvious argument against the parallel is that Stalin's rule 
was characterized by communism. Backer retorted by pointing 
out that both Ivan IV and Stalin ruled in strict dictator­
ships. Communism was simply the method of control tnat Stalin 
used. 1\ however, also exercised stringent control of the 
economy to solidify his power. The only way that the dictat­
orships differed was in the degree to which they employed 
their instruments of control. Doth reduced the standard of 
living, of the lower classes to subsistence existences in 
order to increase their own power and authority.
Jules Kosiow, whose work on Ivan IV appeared in 1961, 
is vulnerable for his style and approach to the Tsar and his 
reign. He followed the view of the central role of Ivan's 
personality in the oprichnina. He discarded the idea that 
Ivan was in any way a reformer. He asserted that Ivan was 
dedicated to increasing the power of the autocracy while being 
engaged in a battle against the aristocracy which he feared
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and hated. Ivan learned to hate the boyars early in his life
when "The boyars fed us 1 Ivan and his younger brother, Yuri]
36as though we were foreigners or the most wretched menials." 
Koslow's style in presenting this quote is indicative of his 
major fault. He did not cite sources, thus the validity of 
the origins of his quotes is always questionable. This quote 
appeared in Kennell's Correspondence Between Prince
A.M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV. The lack of any citations 
cloaked the distinction between quotes and Koslow's personal 
opinions.
Koslow built on the tension between Tsar and aristocracy
by claiming that Ivan's illness in 1553, when the boyars
refused to swear allegiance to the Tsarevich, was the final
blow to all possibilities of good relations between the two
parties. Ivan set up the oprichnina in 1565 in order to break
"the influence and power of old boyar groups by dispossessing
37them of their lands, and thus impoverishing them." The 
brutality of the oprichnina was t he result of the combi nation 
of Ivan's mental condition and the personality of the society 
as a whole. Koslow stated that when Ivan returneu to Moscow 
from Alexandrova Sloboda in 1565, "he appeared to be on the 
verge of a mental and physical breakdown." u Koslow aLso 
said that cruelty was a fact of life in sixteenth-century 
Muscovy and therefore, Ivan was not seen by the people as a 
terrible aberration. The Tsar was also taught early in life
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that pity, kindness, and compassion were not appropriate 
traits of a ruler* Ivan created a band of reckless, brutal 
oprichniki whose company he found greatly pleasing. Koslow 
claimed that the main aim of the oprichnina, the destruction 
of the aristocracy, was not accomplished. The oprichniki 
could never completely crush the aristocracy, but became, in­
stead, a check against its power. The problem was that it 
was "directed against people, not a system." It was there­
fore a pillar of Ivan’s autocratic strength, but it failed 
to alter the system of government that had existed for cen­
turies .
Koslow not onl believed that the oprichnina had little 
effect on the the future of Russia, but he refused to think 
that any aspect of Ivan’s reign caused enduring trends in 
Russian society. Koslow fell into the trap that Dubrovskii 
warned about in 195b: he concentrated on Ivan’s personality 
to the exclusion of attention to the development of the soci­
ety which Ivan ruled. Whereas Soviet historians of the late 
1950’s and 19b0's were adhering, to Dubrovski i* s advice, Koslow 
chose the path of earlier Russian historians, such as V.O. 
Kliuehevskli. Another flaw in Koslow's work was that he was 
all too willing to use convenient facts and disregard data 
that conflicted with his thesis. He took ail reports of 
Ivan's mental imbalance at face value and judged the Tsar's 
claims of treason to be the workings of his twisted mind. 
Ivan’s paranoia was embodied in an obsessive fear that he
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would be assassinated, This fear was solidified by the de­
fection of Prince Kurbskii to Lithuania. Ivan thereafter 
hated to be in the Kremlin and retreated to Alexandrova where 
he wrote to the common people that he was abdicating his 
throne. Koslow made no mention of the common idea that the 
Tsar did this to exact support for his plans to crush the 
ari stocracy.
Koslow's treatment of Ivan's personal actions was in­
consistent. On the one hand, he portrayed Ivan as a cruel 
product of a brutal society whose one period of kindness was 
caused by Anastasia and ended after her death. On the other 
hand, he showed Ivan's cruelty to be caused by his mental 
illness, not social norms. The inconsistencies, lack of 
citations, and disregard for inconvenient facts demonstrate 
that Jules Koslow's work is a biography, not an historical 
stud'’ of Ivan IV. There was no discussion of different views 
or beliefs, just organization of facts to fit the desired 
storyli no.
Ian Grey followed the idea that Ivan IV was a product 
of his age. Cruelty and violence surrounded him. Ivan's 
personality occupied a central role in the events of his 
reign. He showed many characteristics of a manic depressive, 
but the Tsar was exposed to such grotesque violence, especi­
ally in his youth, that he can hardly be blamed for showing 
the effects of such trauma. Grey did not see Ivan the Terr­
ible; he saw Tsar Ivan IV, "the Tsar "to be feared" In the
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sense that the Lord is to he feared.” It was a violent 
time and Ivan was a product thereof, not an aberration.
Ivan was an emotional, compassionate ruler as he showed 
in 1549 when he appeared before the people and exclaimed that 
he would take care of them. His speech denounced the arist­
ocracy which was responsible for the plight of the peasants.
It was more than just a coincidence that the aristocracy was 
a l so l van’ s ma jor oppos i t i.on. I van der i ved support f rom the 
peasants and gentry against their common enemies.
Grey stated chat Ivan’s attacks against the aristocracy 
began in 1560 when the Tsar appeared to transform from the 
pious ruler into the brutal incarnate of evil who was to bring 
his country to its knees. Grey asserted that the change was 
only real outwardly. The violence and brutality had been 
present previously, but had been held in check by Anastasia, 
Sylvester, and Adashev, all of whom were lo. ~ to Ivan by 1560. 
The Tsar blamed the aristocracy for Anastasia’s death because 
it was apparent to him that they harbored great hostility to­
ward her. After ail, they had refused to swear loyalty to her 
and Dmitri! in 1553 because she posed a threat to their pot­
ential power upon the Tsar’s death. Grey denied Ivan’s char­
ges against the aristocracy, citing the fact that there was 
never any proof of her poisoning.
The event which resulted in the oprichnina, according 
to Grey, was the defection of Andrei Kurbskii to Lithuania. 
Ivan saw tangible proof of the treason which he believed was
40
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pervasive amongst the boyars. ”He saw in Kurbsky not an in­
dividual who had fled from just punishment but the represent­
ative of the whole boyar-princely class, voicing their implac­
able malevolence towards him.”^  Ivan set up the oprichnina 
to destroy the aristocracy. Grey admitted that the pattern 
of land confiscation was not indicative of a rationally im­
plemented policy, but he tried to decipher this puzzle by 
breaking the land seizures into three categories according to 
geographical location. His solution is unsatisfactory because 
each category encompasses a separate broad region and collec­
tively the three regions include most of the realm. He simply 
broke the seizures into those in the central region, those in 
the northern provinces, and those in an area "from Vologda 
and Galich in the northeast of Moscow around to Mozhaisk in 
the west, where the oprichniki were mainly settled on est­
ates. This analysis did not explain the pattern o, land 
confiscation,; it only described it.
Grey’s interpretation of the purpose of the oprichnina 
is, above ail, honest. He began by stating that Ivan’s goals 
were unclear. Then he continued with a discussion of the argu 
ment among historians on the subject. He said that no coher­
ent pattern was discernible in the oprichnina’s implementa­
tion. Grey’s entire work on Ivan was adequately summarized 
by his statement that:
"...it would seem that Ivan himself was unclear 
as to his basic purpose. His immediate purpose was, 
however, clear. This was the creation of a separate
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domain under his direct and personal control, where 
he could feel secure."43
Grey did not provide any original conclusions of, or brilli- 
and incites into Ivan’s reign. His work is a "safe" analysis 
of the Tsar. He occupied a position between the views of the 
Soviets and those of the West. He neither idolized nor apo­
logized for him. He dealt with the Tsar, not the society, 
so he felt secure in avoiding extremities in conclusions.
George Vernadsky, alone among American and English his­
torians, centered his work on the society which Ivan ruled. 
Through such analysis, he was able to return to the person 
of the Tsar and present his own conclusions. His study of 
Ivan is part of his voluminous study of Russian history which 
he obviously based on extensive, meticulous research. His 
accounts of the events of Ivan’s riegn are very detailed and 
include the names of many people who were involved. His work 
presents the impression of scientific methodology while a 
majority of the other works on Ivan leave the feeling that 
Ivan was sixteenth-century Russia personified.
Vernadsky's coverage of Ivan starts with the idea that 
the Tsar suffered from a mental condition which began early 
in his life due to his experiences growing up at the mercy 
of the boyars. He became obsessed with his family’s safety 
and with religious matters. When Anastasia died, Ivan blamed 
Adashev, Sylvester, and Kurbskii. Vernadsky contended that 
it was Ivan who was to blame for he undertook frequent pil­
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grimages and always insisted that Anastasia accompany him. 
These trips made her weary and weakened her physical condi­
tion following her several bouts with illness.
In many matters cf state, Vernadsky dealt with the issues 
and policies as a whole, rejecting the idea that Ivan was a 
driving force behind reform and modernization. He credited 
a faction of wise, compassionate members of the Muscovite 
government for recognizing the need for reforms and for draw­
ing up the new law and Church codes. The be 1i111ement of 
Ivan’s role extended into international affairs as well. 
Vernadsky attributed the desire for contact with the West 
to the ’’Moscow government, never specifically mentioning
Ivan. In a study such as this, the Tsar’s involvement is 
not a prerequisite for an event’s analysis. Vernadsky studied 
the society which the Tsar ruled, not the Tsar who ruled 
the society.
The conflict that arose between the Tsar and the arist­
ocracy was very real according to Vernadsky. He stated that 
even before Ivan's il’ness in 1553, certain bc/ars considered 
measures to replace him with a leader more to their liking; 
probably Ivan’s cousin, Prince Vladimir Andreevich Staritsky. 
Ivan was suspicious of the aristocracy since his childhood 
and apparently some of his fears were founded, but he let his 
imagination about treason run wild. Vernadsky assigned most 
of the blame to Ivan, however, because of his continuous, 
excessive fear. The Tsar's fear of the aristocracy precipi­
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tated the bizarre events of December 1564. Ivan felt treach­
ery on all sides and he had to choose between crushing his 
opposition and resigning the throne. He chose the tormcr 
by way of the latter. He was a very intelligent, albeit, 
disturbed, man. He resigned "in such a way that it would not 
be accepted by the people and that he would instead be given
full authority to take repressive measures against his enemies,
45real or alleged.*'
Vernadsky maintained chat Ivan's inability to agree 
with the aristocracy on military matters ultimately led to 
the establishment of the oprichnina. The aristocracy believed 
that the army should be concentrated in the South to fight 
the Tatars and Ivan thought that Livonia deserved the great­
est attention. As for the purposes of the oprichnina, it 
was designed to remove all obstacles to Ivan's absolute auth­
ority and to ensure the Tsar's personal safety The obstac­
les to his power were not solely the aristocrats, but men 
from any class whom he deemed necessary to remove. Vernadsky 
gave no credence to the argument that the oprichnina was the 
climax of a complex social struggle between the traditional 
aristocracy and Ivan and his supporting service gentry. The 
pattern of land division between the oprichnina and the zem- 
schina was too erratic to be the product of a coherent plan.
In addition to the confusing pattern of confiscation, the 
estates that were seized were not always turned over to the 
gentry. Ivan's treasury was often the recipient of confis-
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eated lands. Furthermore, Vernadsky pointed out that the 
policy of land redistribution could have been amply accomp­
lished without the oprichnina's violence.
Vernadsky was completely unforgiving in summarizing the 
effects of the oprichnina. It was devastating to the Musco­
vite economy which was already damaged by the Livonian War. 
Tantamount to the economic hardship that the country experi­
enced was the decline? in the people's morale and the "psycho- 
logical depression oi the nation." Vernadsky suggested 
though, that:
"...perhaps the most tragic result of the oprich­
nina terror was the destruction of so many gifted 
personalities. The elite of Russian society had 
been decimated."47
Robert Payne and Nikita Romanoff presented a classic 
Western interpretation of the reign of Ivan IV. The value 
that they placed on his reign was brilliantly summarized by 
their comment that "His greatest gift to the Russian people 
was his own death." They said that Ivan's reign had a good 
first half and a "terrible" second half, but they did not 
claim that the oprichnina, which was the greatest terror, 
was followed by a seminormal period. They treated the years 
1560-1583 as a time of unthinkable violence. Ivan realized 
the nature of his crimes, but he continued to perpetrate his 
evil.
The Tsar's early years were spent genuinely trying to 
rule for the good of the land. Payne and Romanoff attributed 
much of Ivan's good will and restraint to the presence of
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Anastasia and his advisors, Adashev and Sylvester. Payne and 
Romanoff minimized the credit ascribed to Ivan for the plent­
eous reforms of the 1550*8. They felt that the Tsar’s speech 
to an assembly of churchmen at the Kremlin in 1551 was not 
entirely sincere: "Ivan's mea culpa would have been more im­
pressive if it had come from the heart; it is too contrived
49to be altogether convincing." They contended that much of 
Ivan's popularity arose from a common belief that he was the 
force behind the reforms. He was exalted more highly than 
Alexander Nevsky and Dmitrii Donskoi in the Russians’ legends.
Payne and Romanoff dealt with the change in Ivan's char­
acter with an air of condemnation and a touch of sympathy.
He was timid and suspicious of most people surrounding him.
His fears grew until they consumed him and he became preoccu­
pied with rooting out imaginary sedition. He was mentally ill 
and his rage could not be restrained al>er the deaths of 
Anastasia and Adashev and the exile of Sylvester. He know­
ingly indulged in every conceivable form of vice. He was not 
completely at fault; however, there was no choice for him.
He was raised to believe that he was divinely appointed. His 
crimes struggled with his conscience increasingly, until he 
was driven to extreme depths of madness and evil. He became 
increasingly mechanical in the performance of his violent 
acts.
The oprichnina, which Payne and Romanoff asserted, could 
only be duplicated in the twentieth century, was Ivan's great­
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est act of evil* It was inconsistent in its choice of lands
for no reason of rational policy. They also rejected the
idea that the oprichnina was a carefully planned measure to
strike a fata 1 blow to the 1 anded ari stocracv in order Vo
strengthen the autocracy: "In time a myth grew up that Ivan
was pursuing a carefully formulated social and political poli-
50cy to bring about the annihilation ot the boyar class."
They claimed that a major purpose of the myth was to allow 
Stalin to claim that his actions were justified. They made 
one small attack on Wipper’s work, saying chat he was errant 
in stating that Ivan understood society and that he was att­
empting to improve the state for the people. Ivan may not 
have understood the broad social forces, but he did under­
stand people’s fears. His false abdication in 1564 was an ex­
ample of this understanding. It was a measure calculated to 
drum up the support of the common man. He told the people 
that he had to leave because of the treason of the aristo-
51cracy. They asserted that "he did not abdicate; he accused."
Payne and Romanoff denied the Soviet view that Ivan was 
a "great and wise ruler"; however, they avoided the hardline 
view that everything involved in his reign was evil, as well. 
Their argument was tbit he was not a visionary who fought to 
transform society into the modern state form. There were 
some positive effects of his rule, such as the building of 
the Russian empire; "Ivan was the true founder of this empire,
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which would always bear the imprint of his character, his 
violence, his rages, his towering ambitions, his pride and 
strange humility."^ They also dealt with his desire for 
contacts in the West which was a case of futuristic vision. 
They covered the arts in Ivan's reign extensively. It was a 
time of destruction, but a time of building as well. St. 
Basil's Cathedral is the most famous work of architectural 
art in his reign, but there was also much music and writing 
which originated from this period. A serious contradiction 
appears in their treatment of Ivan's positive accomplishments. 
Whereas at one point, they said that the empire was shaped 
by the Tsar's personality, they later claimed that he was 
fortunate In his successes. He simply backed into success, 
they claimed. If indeed he was the timid ruler that they 
depicted, he would have experienced difficulty in forging 
an empire in his image.
David Mackenzie and Michael Curran compiled A History 
of Kussia and the Soviet Union in 1977. They prefaced their 
work by stating that they rejected the Marxist tendency of 
forcing events in history into inflexible, predetermined pat­
terns. They also denied that political change must always 
be preceded by socioeconomic change. They further asserted 
that while the Russian economy contained features of feudalism 
between 860 and 1861, it would be incorrect to describe Rus­
sian society of this period as feudaliStic. They described
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their view of Russian history as following "middle course be­
tween the geographical determinism of the Eurasian school and
the organic, inner-oriented approach of Soviet and many 19th-
53century Russian historians."
MacKenzie and Curran assigned Ivan a prominent role in 
the development of Russian autocracy. They subscribed to 
the view of Ivan as mistreated by the boyars in his youth.
They also believed in the existence of the Chosen Council 
which many historians asserted never existed. They deprived 
Ivan of any role in initiating the reforms and calling the 
zemskii sobor of 1550. The idea of building a strong army on 
the service of the new gentry was posed to the Tsar by a 
leader of the gentry, Ivan S. Peresvetov. The list of ques­
tions intended to effect reforms in the Church which bore 
Ivan*s name was actually drawn up by the Council, according 
to MacKenzie and Curran.
MacKenzie and Curran asserted that Ivan’s break with the 
Council that led to the oprichnina occurred before Anastasia's 
death which is commonly seen as the cause of Ivan’s violent 
moods. The oprichnina and his initial step of abdicating 
to gain the support of the "ommoners were rational measures 
in his drive to crush his opponents. They maintained that 
Ivan was not acting solely to destroy the aristocracy. He 
saw treason at all levels and he wanted to remove it. The 
reduction of the power of the aristocracy was a result of the
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execution of the oprichnina. It bcnefitted Ivan because it 
removed a barrier to his complete authority. They said that, 
in the end, the oprichnina was unsuccessful and divisive.
They presented, in their work, a series of ’’problems” 
which are events that are characterized by serious interpret- 
ationai debates among historians. The oprichnina was the 
third probLem that they covered. They provided a short hist­
oriographical analysis of the oprichnina, stressing the diff­
erences between Soviet and Western views. They concluded 
their analysis of the oprichnina by saying ’’Farsighted in 
some ways, nearsighted in others, Ivan and his reign should
e j
neither be glorified nor totally condemned.” Russian soci­
ety and economy were devastated at the end of Ivan's reign 
and a case can be made that the Time of Troubles was a direct 
result of the Tsar's actions, but the foundations for strong 
centralized administration and expansion of the state were 
implemented in the reign of Ivan IV.
Francis Carr devoted the first third of his study of 
Ivan IV to establishing the conditions of the society which 
Ivan came to rule. The importance of the Mongol military 
and administrative functions which were learned and copied 
in Muscovy were delineated. Carr believed that the collect­
ive psyche of the Russian people was a vital component of 
the Tsar's effectiveness. According to Carr, the Russians 
are and were a submissive people:
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"The Russians spare their tyrants; they kill only 
those monarchs that lack barbarity. Here we see 
the basic weakness of the Russian people— their 
frightening passivity, their acceptance of their 
roles as members of a giant community, not as in­
dividuals with definite human rights."55
Carr employed the same argument in discussing Ivan's 
abdication in 1564. He asserted that in any other country, 
Ivan's maneuver would have cost him his throne. The people's 
obedience facilitated the action. The Tsar lowered his def­
enses and dared his enemies to seixe the moment, which played 
on the fear of the common man. Paradoxically, Ivan's weak­
ness made him stronger than ever. The people panicked like
56"bees in a hive, deprived of their queen." The Tsar's luck 
held— the aristocracy refused to act against him.
The only praise that Carr could muster for Ivan in re­
gards to the oprichnina was that he was honest on his return 
to Moscow from Alexandrova when he demanded free reign to 
dispose of his enemies without interference. Apart from this 
he described the oprichnina as a microcosm of hell. He used 
the accounts of foreign travellers to illustrate the savagery 
Many of these foreigners wrote second-hand accounts which 
were greatly exaggerated, but he found that they showed con­
siderable correlation on the fact that the oprichnina was 
brutal beyond compare. But was it the work of a cold, calcul 
ating killer? Carr pointed out many signs of a mental dis­
order in Ivan. First of all, he claimed that the patchwork 
pattern of oprichnina lands was irrational and simply bol­
63
stered the country's pervasive confusion. Secondly, he noted 
that the severity of the attacks may have been the result 
of Ivan’s introversion. The Tsar acted rashly and then fell 
into sessions of remorse. This cycle hammered away at Ivan's 
conscience until he institutionalized the killing. Finally, 
while the oprichnina was supposedly meant to crush the arist­
ocracy, many others suffered greatly. Carr ignored the fact 
that the brutal subjugation of the peasantry may have been 
undertaken in order to strengthen the financial position of 
the service gentry which relied on peasant labor.
The major drawback in Carr's work is his reliance on
convenient facts and exclusion of contradictory information.
He viewed Ivan as intellectually overmatched by many of his
aides. This, he claimed, was the cause of many problems.
Ivan could not tolerate being surrounded by those who did
not understand his omniscience and divine right. He did not
even mention the tact that a majority of the studies on Ivan
acknowledge that he was very intelligent and well-read. He
also stated that "Kurbsky and most of his boyars wished to
57assist their Tsar as responsible ministers." Earlier, 
he described the court intrigues during Ivan's childhood, 
but here he wrote as if the aristocracy's lust for power sud­
denly disappeared. His is a one-sided argument. He excluded 
contrary data in an effort to accentuate Ivan's madness and 
cruelty, but he weakened his credibility by ignoring the 
"other" truth.
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Carr spent an excessive amount of time detailing numer­
ous tortures, rapes, murders, and other atrocities of the 
oprichnina. His analysis leaves no question of the Tsar’s 
brutality. He went so far as to quote from the Old Testament 
to describe the harvest failures hich resulted from the
oprichnina: Mit hath no stalk; the bud shall yield no meal;
58if so be it yield, the strangers shall swallow it up.”
In instances such as this, Carr tended to be somewhat theat­
rical in eliciting a desired effect.
Carr’s conclusion is full of facts and statistics that 
depict a country that has been to hell and back. He told of 
desertion of peasant homes en masse in northern and western 
Russia, Novgorod’s population was reduced to 20 percent of 
its former size. Villages were empty. Overall, the country 
was in ruin, Ivan’s refusal to accept a favorable armistice 
with Sigismund resulted in the loss of all of the Russians’ 
gains in the North. Ivan’s reign, in Carr’s opinion, was a 
failure on all fronts. His greatest legacy was that future 
tyrants employed his methods. Peter the Croat, Lenin, Stalin, 
and Hitler all exacted the same submissive loyalty from their
people as Ivan had done. In this respect, ’’the screams of
59Ivan's many victims can still be heard."
Thomas Butson's presentation of Ivan IV in a series of 
books entitled World Leaders Past and Present is remarkably 
thoughtful for a work of its kind. Butson dealt with Russia 
as it fit into the world of the sixteenth century. He used
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quotes of foreign travellers to Russia extensively, to sup­
port his ideas. He also explained that Ivan, in the years 
preceding the oprichnina, was no more cruel than other Euro­
pean rulers, such as King Henry VIII of England and Catherine 
de Medici of France. Before 1560, Ivan strove for moderni­
zation and took the advice of his council to heart. In fact, 
he allowed them to openly criticize him when they felt it 
was deserved. Butson gave the council the credit for initi­
ating the call for a new law code. Accotding to Butson, they 
urged Ivan to call a zemsky sobor in 1550. Once the movement 
began, Ivan took the lead and oversaw an overhaul of many 
areas of Russian society. Butson insisted, however, that 
judicial affairs remained terribly backward. Many people 
were simply assumed to be guilty and exposed to sadistic tor­
tures. Even though this gross iniquity remained, the Tsar 
truly wanted to improve the life of the average Russian.
Butson said that the oprichnina was more a result of a 
lack of any restraining influence on Ivan than some sudden 
new event. Ivan had been in almost constant argument with 
the aristocracy in the I560's over the Livonian War. Anas­
tasia, the most calming force in Ivan’s life, died in 1560. 
Ivan's moods took the final turn toward violence in 1563 when 
Metropolitan Makary, the last positive influence in the Tsar's 
life, and Ivan's younger brother, Yuri, both died. Butson 
detailed Ivan's abdication and move to Alexandrova Sloboda 
in 1564, but he was very unclear in providing the reasons
66
for it. He did not claim to adhere to either of the possible 
interpretations: that Ivan was acting in a rational manner 
in order to exact a promise of a free hand in subjugating 
the aristocracy or that he had a serious mental condition 
which fa reed him t o a e t i r ra 11ona11y.
It was not until Ivan's return to Moscow and the estab­
lishment of the oprichnina that Ivan displayed signs of "a
severe emoti ona1 c ri si s...He suffered frum ni ghtmares and
60hallucinations. His eyes were dulled." Ivan was overcome 
with paranoia over the possibility of treason amongst those 
who surrounded him. His fear had its roots in the poor treat 
ment that he endured at the hands of the boyars in his child­
hood. Butson stressed the boyars' cruelty by beginning his 
work with the story of the group of boyars who burst into the 
ll-year old Ivan's room while he was asleep, to search for 
Metropolitan Joseph. He emphasised the fear that the young 
Ivan experienced by ending this account with the comment that 
when the boyars left, "they threw a last look of contempt at
the terrified Ivan and left to continue their search. He
■ ■ ■ ■
would not forget."
The purpose of the oprichnina was to deprive the aristo^ 
cracy of its power and thus avoid the situation that had occ­
urred in Poland when the aristocracy had basically caused 
anarchy. Ivan replaced the aristocracy with pomestchiki of 
the gentry whose landholding was contingent on loyal service
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to the Tsar. Ivan foil owed this action up by providing the 
gentry with a permanent labor force, the serfs who were now 
bound to the land indefinitely* With this action, Ivan had 
extended his absolutist rule to the lowest class in society 
and solidified the Russian autocracy.
Ivan’s reign was not a mere blemish on Russian history. 
Butson pointed out that Ivan "transformed the country from 
a collection of petty fiefdoms into a true national state, 
and he brought Russia into the wider European arena." He 
also strengthened the centralized administration of the gov­
ernment. His actions facilitated increasing contact with 
the ideas and inventions of Western Europe. He was also re­
sponsible for establishing fasting trade ties with the English 
and the Dutch. Russia had doubled in size during Ivan’s 
reign. He destroyed the last remnants of the feudal order 
and paved the way for modernization. Overall, Butson asserted 
that Ivan was "a strong man for a time when a strong man had 
been needed.
An examination of Benson Bobrick’s Fearful Majesty Is 
a logical conclusion in a study of this kind because it is 
not only the most recent of the non^Russian works, but it is 
a synthesis of considerable previous research. His sources 
range from Platonov, Skrynnikov, and Veseiovskii to Koslow 
and Backer for the biographies of the Tsar and he used num­
erous studies covering myriad topics of sixteenth century
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Russian society. Bobrick did not profess to provide any ori­
ginal revelations about the reign of Ivan IV which is his 
strength. He pulled together the views and research of many 
writers and filled in the spaces with his own research and 
ideas. He based his work on the framework that pits Ivan 
against the aristocracy. The new service class, the gentry, 
shared the Tsar’s interests and joined forces wifh him in 
his quest to displace the aristocracy.
Bobrick devoted considerable time to covering Ivan’s 
policies that were separate from the oprichnina. Ivan planned 
to effect broad reforms involving military, financial, judi­
cial, and centralized governmental administration and the 
Church in 1549, asserted Bobrick. The Tsar was most heavily 
influenced by Ivan Peresvetov, a West Russian, who recommended 
fair and consistent judicial practices, manumition of slaves, 
and military restructuring. The suggested military changes 
included establishment of a standing army in which promotion 
was based on merit, not heredity. This was the basis of the 
pomeste* landholdings which gave the gentry its power and 
tied its interests intrinsically to Ivan’s. Bobrick claimed 
that the purpose of the reforms was to strengthen the central 
administration through Increased revenue, a more vigorous 
judiciary, and a strong, we11-trained army.
Ivan’s sweeping reforms and view to the future facili­
tated the atrocities of the iSbO’s and 1570’s. The Tsar saw
that the pomeste' system of landholding for military service 
was the foundat ion of Russia’s army. But most of the iand 
was tied up in hereditary estates, votehina, or belonged to 
the Church. Ivan realized that he needed to provide more 
land throughout the country to the gentry, but he could not 
simply take votehina or Church lands without provocation.
He needed a believable excuse to seize the necessary lands.
Ivan found justification for harsh action against the 
aristocracy, whoso interests clashed with his, in the increa­
sing seditious opposition in which the aristocracy was invol­
ved, in the 1550’s and 1560's. On this topic, Bobrlck exten­
sively utilized the correspondence between Ivan and Prince 
Andreii Kurbskii who had fled to Lithuania. Ivan, Bobrlck 
believed, wrote "a remarkable 28,000-word rebuttal that in­
cluded a defense of autocracy and intimate revelations about 
the unhappiness of his childhood," in reply to Kurbskii*s 
attacks on Ivan's cruelty. Bobrlck saw Ivan's initiation of 
the oprichnina as a completely rational response to growing 
opposition in the traditional aristocracy and the need for 
more land for the pro-crown gentry. Bobrick asserted that 
"To impress upon the nation the extremity of his frustration 
and resentment, he abdicated and did so too in a manner that
was both theatrical and deliberately mystifying to all but
6 5his inner circle." Ivan followed this action by sending a 
letter to the merchants and common men for whom he held no 
contempt. The message reminded the crowds of the evils of the
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aristocracy. The result was growing anti-aristocratic senti­
ment and increased desperation over the need to procure the 
return of the Tsar who was their protector against the brutal 
aristocracy.
Ivan returned to Moscow after being told by the people 
that they wanted him to have freedom to do as he wished in 
order to save the country. Bobrick stated that Ivan institu­
ted the oprichnina to break the power of the aristocracy, 
giving land to the gentry and setting up the pattern of gov­
ernment that his sons could rule within. There were excesses 
initially, to be sure, but they were the result of corruption 
among the oprichniki who began to allow torture to dominate 
their methods of intimidation. Bobrick asserted, however, 
that the oprichnina was rationally executed throughout. The 
inconsistency of the choice of lands to be brought into the 
oprichnina is thought by many historian* f~o be a sign of 
Ivan’s madness, but Bobrick explained that "oprichnina hold­
ings were interspersed with zemschina land in a crazy-quilt
patchwork improvised to prevent the zemschina from comprising
b 6an integrated of continuous realm."
The pattern of land may have been calculated, but Bob­
rick admitted that the atrocities brought down upon thousands 
of boyars and merchants were products of Ivan's obsession 
with perceived threats to his personal safety: "The purges
had no discernible social goal. The issue was treason, most
67of it imaginary." This idea contradicts Bobrick's earlier
71
assertion that the expropriation of diverse landholdings was 
the logical fulfillment of the oprichnina*s objectives. In 
one instance, he stated that the oprichnina followed rational 
policy and in another, that it victimized an immense group 
of people whose backgrounds reflected the approximate makeup 
of the whole society. How can the same program efficiently 
execute forcible, but rational, land possession measures while 
also operating a brutal reign of terror whose victims* guilt 
was questionable at best?
Bobrick followed his analysis of the oprichnina by detail
ing later accomplishments such as the conquest of Siberia
b Mwhich compensated **for the loss of Polotsk and Livonia.*'
Bobrick finished his work by describing how the epithet "The
Terrible" was attached to Ivan's name:
"Whatever the early accomplishments of his reign, 
or the historical trends to which they may have 
been attuned, calamities substantially of his own 
creation overwhelmed them, and the scourge of his 
epithet remains."69
Herein lies the core of Bobrick's interpretation of Ivan.
The Tsar was responsible for many positive reforms and for 
many horrifying atrocities, but his importance to history 
rests in the patterns which he effected that would later make 
Russia the great land that it became. Bobrick accordingly 
prefaced his work by saying that to understand modern Russia, 
one must look at the Muscovy of Ivan's time for "Traces of 
Muscovy continue to this day, and are broadly reflected in 
everything from popular customs to government organizations
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and foreign relations.”
Historical analyses and biographies of Ivan IV by Amer­
ican and English authors do not fail into well defined cate­
gories or periods as the Russian historical works do. The 
non-Russian writers rely heavily on Russian works as sources, 
but they present a wide range of different views. A majority 
of them concentrate on Ivan himself, rather than on society 
in general. While many of the Russian works are intended, 
in some degree, to diminish the individual responsibility 
that Ivan holds for the grave suffering of sixteenth-century 
Russia, the American and English writers, in general, make 
clear the fact that they place ultimate accountability on 
Ivan. Some Americans, such as George Backer and Francis Carr, 
have centered their works on the idea that Russian society 
was to blame for allowing Ivan to carry on his brutality.
The concept of Russian acceptance of tyrants has caused 
another difference between Russian and Western works. Many 
Westerners were able to write, during Stalin’s rule, that the 
Russian historians, such as Wipper, meekly accepted Stalin’s 
view of Ivan’s reign, regardless of their own feelings.
Walther Kirchner was one of the few Western historians who 
employed the Stalinist approach in his writing. There has 
been no strict periodization of works on Ivan in the West. 
Kirchner*s study appeared in 1948 and Backer’s Deadly Parallel 
was first published in 1950 at the height of Soviet historians’
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idolizing of Ivan. These two works appeared within two years 
of each other and, yet, they are at opposite ends of the spec­
trum of interpretations of Ivan. Backer's work alleged that 
both Ivan and Stalin were cruel, irrational leaders, a con­
cept that would never have appeared in print in Stalin's Sov­
iet Union. Kirchner's work claimed that Ivan facilitated 
Russia's move into the future.
The range of interpretations in Western historical works 
on Ivan involves the degree to which Ivan, alone, deserves the 
blame for the oprichnina's terror, rather than debating wheth­
er Ivan was a wise, farseeing ruler or an imbalanced tyrant. 
Most Western historians agree that Ivan was at least partially 
irrational; only a few argue that his policies were reason­
able and successful. Authors' views of several events in 
Ivan's reign— the retreat to Alexandrova Sloboda in 1564, the 
Tsar's illness in 1553, the concept of Anastasia's poisoning 
in 1560, and the validity of assertions of aristocratic sedi­
tion— serve as barometers of the degree of rationality which 
Western historians attribute to the Tsar. Overall, the gene­
ral view of Ivan, in American and English works, seems to be 
that his reign succeeded in expanding the Russian state and 
establishing contacts with the West, but was a disaster in 
the domestic sphere. It is generally maintained that Russia 
would have reached the same level of modernization in the fut­
ure, though perhaps in a differnt manner, if Iva.i had never 
come to power.
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